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I want to thank Cynthia Willett, Ron Sundstrom, Robert 
Gooding-Williams, and Sally Haslanger, who arranged this 
virtual panel, and Shannon Sullivan, Bill Wilkerson, Kathryn 
Gines, and Alia Al-Saji, who have offered their critiques of 
my book. For any author, an opportunity such as this is a 
great privilege and an honor. I appreciate it deeply. 
Unfortunately I do not have space to address individually 
each issue these four papers raise. Instead, I will first situate 
my work in relation to identity politics and address fears that 
my approach is reductive. Then, building on comments from 
Professors Wilkerson and Al-Saji, I will offer some remarks 
about aims, methods, and shortcomings. 
********** 
Earlier this year the governing board of Equality Virginia (an 
LGBT rights organization affiliated with the Human Rights 
Campaign) voted to prohibit Executive Director Jon Blair 
from working in coalition with any group that did not make 
“LGBT issues” its focus. By withdrawing Blair’s mandate, the 
EV board repudiated its affiliation with the C3 Table, a 
coalition of 501c3 organizations in Virginia who share 
resources and support each others’ work on issues ranging 
from housing and health care to environmental justice to 
racial profiling. Now, while other organizations build a 
network of shared knowledge and political connections, 
Equality Virginia will “go it alone.”  
Whatever it may be in theory, this is identity politics “on the 
ground,” and it is a failing strategy. As board secretary for the 
group that pioneered the C3 Table (Virginia Organizing, 
www.virginia-organizing.org), I believe the only way to resist 
oppression effectively is to build alternative 
power/knowledge networks to counter and disrupt 
dominant networks. We cannot do that by confining 
ourselves to the categories to which we are assigned within 
those dominant networks. 
Ironically, Equality Virginia’s insistence on the purity of 
LGBT activism results from the diversity that exists among 
people who identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, or 
transgendered. Activists fear that if they fail to keep a tight 
focus, they will alienate one or another sector of that base—
especially the upper-middle-class major-donor sector, which 
is largely white and largely male. It may well be that a 
majority of this group rejects the idea that the discrimination 
they suffer is in any way connected with current 
manifestations of anti-black or anti-brown racism, let alone 
with the marginalization of the poor and disabled or the 
destruction of the environment. But whether major donors 
would reject that idea or not, activists who depend on their 
contributions never risk putting it forward. Anyone attentive 
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to mainstream gay rights rhetoric knows this: Whenever gay 
rights activists draw analogies between their situation or 
movement and those of racial minorities, they always cite the 
past—i.e., Jim Crow and the SCLC. They want to harness the 
power of a now-hallowed history of struggle, not take their 
place alongside other groups suffering oppression in the 
present. Professor Gines to the contrary, they never claim to be 
victims of racism; they claim to be victims of something that 
is not racism but that is analogous to the racism of a bygone 
era.  
My book takes a different approach. While it does not 
preclude some versions of identity politics, as Professor Al-
Saji aptly notes, it refuses to take identities as fundamental to 
its analysis. Accordingly, it is not about race or gender or 
sexual orientation. It is about racism and sexual oppression—
that is, it is about power.  
An ancestor to the power networks we today recognize as 
racism arose when colonists in Virginia and Maryland took 
the concept of racial lineage and reworked it to produce a 
concept of racial morphology as a tool to discipline a 
population of culturally various European immigrants, 
African slaves and freedmen, and indigenous Americans. The 
usual ways of categorizing people—by lineage, language, 
religion, social class—did not work for British planters and 
governors in the “new world,” where so many different 
people from different ancestries and geographical areas 
mingled and had to be fitted into a relatively new kind of 
economic machine. Dividing people into a few large groups 
based on physical appearance worked better. Decades later, 
this set of classifying practices was dignified by scientific and 
philosophical theories that “accounted” for physical 
differences and linked them with other sorts of differences—
in intellect, moral sensitivity, etc.—that purportedly justified 
differential legal treatment and economic use. 
Like lineal racism, morphological racism is an ancestor of 
modern racism. Through the nineteenth century 
morphological race was absorbed into discourses and 
practices of normalization and biopower and, in the process, 
fused with the dispositif de sexualité. The latter half of my book 
traces that fusion, which gave us the scientific racism of the 
late nineteenth century, the eugenics of the first half of the 
twentieth century, and the postwar pro-family movement. 
That racism is thoroughly sexualized. It seethes with anxiety 
about white lineal purity and so demands strict surveillance 
over the sexual conduct of people of color and white women.  
Many people have noted this fact. But, coming at it from a 
psychological perspective, most treat the sexualization of 
racial difference as an imposition; there is racial difference 
and then, through various psycho-social mechanisms, those 
perceived differences are suffused with sexual meaning. My 
book makes a very different claim: Sexuality—the apparatus 
of power that Foucault describes in The History of Sexuality—
came into existence in the process by which race was 
transformed from morphology to an expression of 
developmental biology; as racial difference came to be 
understood as an effect of evolutionary development (or the 
failure, retardation, or reversal thereof), sexual reproduction 
came to be seen as a site of extreme danger and tremendous 
potential. Simultaneously a disparate set of discourses and 
practices coalesced to form the dispositif de sexualité—an 
assemblage of overlapping, interlocking, mutually reinforcing 
but not necessarily consistent networks of force relations. 
Thus, the birthplace of sexuality lies in the networks of 
biopower that historians term “scientific racism.” One of the 
book’s most controversial claims is that sexuality is always 
thoroughly racial. Sexuality was “invented” to discipline and 
normalize racialized populations in the racist project of 
Anglo-Saxon world domination. Sexuality, as Professor Al-
Saji puts it, “is a tool of white supremacy.” 
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History shows this clearly. By the nineteenth century’s end, 
morphological races were understood as, essentially, deviants 
from the normal course of evolutionary progress—i.e., as 
abnormal. Simultaneously—and primarily because of these 
discursive and institutional formations—any other sort of 
developmental deviation (abnormality) that hardened into a 
category got construed and treated as a race. All kinds of 
developmental deviations—whether morphological races, 
morons, sex perverts, or criminals—were deviations from the 
path of evolutionary advance, which northern Europeans had 
supposedly been moving steadily along ever since they 
“invented” civilization; deviants were throwbacks, atavisms, 
or degenerates, a danger to what eventually became the 
evolutionarily progressive human gene pool. Thus it is, as 
Professor Al-Saji notes, that race is the measure of all 
abnormality, at least in the mark this history leaves on all 
developmental difference. And, thus, there is no way for 
responsible analysis to rush through the “race stuff,” as 
Professor Gines puts it, in order to get to the “sexual 
oppression stuff”; there are not two “stuffs.” Professor Al-Saji 
puts it well: “one oppression is already many.” Sexual 
oppression is one of the ways that racism is carried out, 
extended, and maintained; racism is sexually oppressive. 
Professor Gines fears that this conceals the specificity of black 
lesbian experience. Professor Sullivan worries that something 
is lost if we understand Matthew Shepard as, at some level, a 
casualty of racism. Professor Wilkerson wants us to 
remember that there is such a thing as black homophobia. I 
share my interlocutors’ desire to maintain analytic specificity. 
In genealogical practice any loss of specificity is problematic; 
difference and discontinuity are the resources to be 
inventoried and deployed to disrupt power networks that 
normalize, homogenize, manage, and repress. Genealogy 
cannot be reductive. It must maintain awareness of difference. 
The Nazis’ murder of six million Jews is not the same as the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs’ program to eradicate Native 
American cultures. The enslavement of African Americans is 
not the same as the life-long incarceration and forced labor of 
impoverished Appalachians in efforts to protect normal 
citizens from the menace of the feebleminded. And none of 
these events is the same as the systematic mutilation of the 
genitals and brains of homosexual men and women in 
psychiatric hospitals through most of the twentieth century. 
This book’s point is not that these events are the same or that 
their differences are unimportant. But, as importantly 
different as they are, they are connected, and if we fail to heed 
those connections, we will fail to understand and effectively 
oppose the networks of power that oppress us. 
My book analyzes racism as a vast, historically emerging, 
shifting network of power/knowledge relations that 
produces multiple differential effects—e.g., multiple subject 
positions; multiple forms of oppression, experience and 
injustice; multiple and conflicting discursive regimes. I am 
acutely aware that this genealogical approach differs radically 
from virtually all twentieth-century work on racism and that 
with novelty there are always risks. Nevertheless, I believe 
my analysis maintains the crucial distinction between 
racism—the shifting power-knowledge network it 
examines—and the multiple differential effects that racism 
produces. Nothing in the book prevents thorough exploration 
of black lesbian experience or the many factors that led to 
Matthew Shepard’s murder or the differences between life 
and death in the Castro and life and death in the Barrio. Nor 
does the book lend credence to Limbaugh-esque cries of anti-
white racism, as Professor Gines suggests. In fact, by 
revealing white supremacy’s close ties to neoconservatism, it 
undercuts such outrageous assertions. 
As Professor Wilkerson underlines, I do not offer a systematic 
theory of oppression. Racism and Sexual Oppression in Anglo-
America does not ask readers to give up everything and 
follow either its epistemological or its political lead. The 
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purpose of genealogical practice, as I understand it, is to 
discover new points of departure. Its success is measured not 
by how much truth it produces but by whether it opens new 
possibilities for thought, feeling, and action. In other words, 
genealogy is meant to move us. 
Sometimes Foucault refers to genealogy as “counter-
memory.” It is not merely deconstructive. It assembles a new 
narrative about how things came to be as they are, one that 
opposes the way things are not by arguing against them on 
logical or moral grounds but by undermining the plausibility 
of the narratives that justify them, render them seemingly 
inevitable, and silence the rage and pain they produce. It is 
meant to connect with that rage and pain and with other 
fragments of memories—with what Foucault calls subjugated 
knowledges—to make possible a network of counter forces, a 
different way of seeing that siphons away the credibility and 
affective energy of the narratives that hold oppressive 
structures in place. A genealogy is not a definitive statement. 
It is a beginning. What it hopes to initiate is a realignment of 
forces beyond its own text. That is one reason I welcome this 
discussion and appreciate these four colleagues’ remarks. A 
genealogy is a move seeking to incite more moves. If it 
provokes no questions and spurs no steps beyond itself, it is 
wasted effort.  
Unlike Michel Foucault, I am not a master genealogist. This 
project was at times unwieldy, much bigger than I was, and 
frequently out of my emotional and scholarly control. The 
book raises many more questions than it settles and points in 
many more directions than I could possibly go. At times, 
perceiving a massive weight on the side of alternative views, I 
no doubt overstated my case, as Professors Sullivan and Al-
Saji have intimated. At times I argued vociferously against 
my own viscera and long-held beliefs. The text betrays the 
raw edges of the transformations I underwent while writing 
it. It is an amazingly imperfect book. But writing it did move 
me; it opened avenues for thinking that I had not previously 
imagined. I hope it can do something similar for its readers, 
even if it serves them only as Wittgenstein’s ladder, to be 
discarded once it is used. 
Thank you all again for your time, attention, and insights. 
 
